Order Denying Lender's Motion to Set Aside Foreclosure Sale Reversed

In LaSalle Bank National Association v. Alicea (5D09-2129),  the Fifth District reversed the trial court's denial of a lenders motion to stop, and later set aside, a foreclosure sale.  The lender and the borrower reached an agreement prior to the sale and attempted to stop the sale.  The court stated:

appeals the trial court's non-final order denying its objection to sale and emergency motion to vacate summary final judgment and to vacate foreclosure sale and to return funds to the third party purchaser

***

LaSalle filed an objection to the sale and an emergency motion to vacate summary final judgment and to vacate foreclosure sale and to return funds to the third party purchaser. It asserted that the judicial sale of the property should be set aside because the sale price was grossly inadequate. LaSalle stated that Alicea "purchased the property for the amount of $225,000.00 on 03/28/2007" and that the current tax appraisal value was $160,644.00. LaSalle noted other irregularities: that the affidavits filed in support of its motion for summary final judgment were not in compliance with the time requirements of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510(c), and the sale should not have taken place because proof of publication of the notice of sale had not been filed with the Clerk prior to the sale date. The trial court again denied LaSalle's objection and motion without a hearing, using the "DENIED" stamp with a handwritten date of May 20, 2009.

***

LaSalle filed a motion for rehearing or in the alternative motion to vacate certificates of sale and title...

***

In this case, as in the Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank cases, there is nothing establishing that the documents bearing these executed "denied" stamps were filed with the clerk of the court or when they were filed. As with the Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank cases, these orders cannot be considered properly rendered or final. We elect to treat this matter as a premature appeal and relinquish jurisdiction to the trial court for a period of thirty days for properly rendered orders. Because the trial judge involved in these cases is no longer on the bench, the successor judge will necessarily have to consider the motions de novo.

In this case, as in the Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank cases, there is also no reason we can discern why denial of the plaintiff lender's repeated motions to cancel the foreclosure sale should not have been granted, and the procedure followed by the trial judge leaves us in doubt that the motions were given any merits consideration. Accordingly, in order to enable meaningful appellate review, if the trial court again denies LaSalle's motions, it must provide reasons.